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As its Council Member I attended the ICC Institute of World Business Law’s 32
nd
 annual meeting on 
‘Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration’ held in Paris on 26 November 2012. It was a grand 
success as it drew many professionals, arbitrators, experts, academic specialists and, above all, 
representatives from some major third-party funding bodies  such as Burford Group Ltd., Calunius 
Capital LLP, Fulbrook Management LLC and others, and the discussion and debates generated a 
great deal of interest among  the participants. The presented topics ranged from the concepts of 
litigation and arbitration financing to more complicated issues such as ethical issues of third-party 
funding (TPF), due diligence and decision making process in investing in claims by third parties, 
conflict of interests for arbitrators / counsel, arbitrator’s independence and impartiality, 
confidentiality and disclosure of TPF and the problems of TPF in investor-State arbitration. The 
purpose of this blog is to highlight some of the burning issues passionately debated in the meeting. 
Following the Chatham House Rule the views express herein will not be specifically attributed to any 
individual or organization. 
One of the issues debated was the concept and nature of TPF itself. As the concept is ever evolving 
in recent years in the field of arbitration, the participants’ views did not seem to point to a 
consensus on a fixed definition of TPF. However, certain existing models in practice were articulated 
in the discussion.  The notion of third-party litigation financing (in a broad sense) is not new as it has 
been in practice in the USA for more than a century now (i.e. contingency fee arrangement), though 
in Europe it is relatively a new phenomenon and fragmented in practice (e.g. conditional fee 
arrangement is permitted in England; pure contingency fee arrangement is permitted in Italy while it 
being prohibited in England and in many other countries in Europe such as France, Switzerland, 
Sweden and Spain). In the field of arbitration TPF is recently emerging as an attractive option 
facilitating access to justice to an impecunious party who may have a credible / meritorious claim. 
Arbitration finance is a specialty corporate finance focused on arbitration claims (i.e. the award 
proceeds) as assets being used as collateral to obtain such finance which is a non-recourse one. The 
reward or return of the third-party funder is said to be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
Normally, a percentage of the damages ranging from 20 percent to 40 percent or a cost multiple, 
usually running from two to four, or a combination of these is applied to determine the third-party 
 2 
 
funder’s return. Some participants expressed various ideas around the concept of TPF such as third-
party funder’s buying equity interest in the claim or a share in the proceeds of a prospective arbitral 
award, or a joint venture (in the sense of equity joint venture, i.e. by monitizing the claim) 
arrangement between the client and the third-party funder. As opposed to the aforementioned 
narrow connotation to TPF, others tended to suggest a broad one encompassing also other contracts 
as “derivatives” such as contingency fees arrangements between a client and counsel and insurance 
contracts (e.g. for adverse costs), etc. Some third-party funders indicated that TPF, in time, might 
evolve into complex financial engineering (e.g. credit default swaps) involving other related financial 
products, but it remains to be seen as the market develops and demand grows in the years ahead. 
The third-party financing is an investment per se in arbitration (albeit a high-risk investment) to be 
described as a portfolio investment rather than direct. Both claimants and respondents can take the 
advantage of TPF at any stage during the arbitration proceedings and beyond, i.e. at the stage of the 
enforcement of the arbitral award.  
A significant amount of time was dedicated to the debate of ethics of TPF and thereby conflict of 
interests that might arise in that respect. The involvement of a third-party funder may raise the issue 
of impartiality or independence of an arbitrator in certain circumstances. For example, a situation 
could arise where a person acts as an arbitrator in a case in which the claimant is financed by the 
same third-party funder who had also financed a claimant in another case in which the same person 
(i.e. the arbitrator) acted as that claimant’s Counsel. So, the same third-party funder’s involvement 
in two cases with the same person acting in two different capacities, i.e. arbitrator and counsel, 
could raise issues of impartiality or / and independence of the latter, i.e. conflict of interests. Apart 
from that, the third-party funder’s influence or involvement, if any, in the choice of an arbitrator 
could also beg the question whether that might bring to bear on the determination of the eventual 
amount of damages in the prospective arbitral award. Among the other concerns expressed was the 
probability of a third-party funder’s abuse of its stronger bargaining leverage against a vulnerable 
impecunious party in any way. Furthermore, the involvement of a third-party funder could deter the 
prospect of a settlement of the dispute by the parties if it does not satisfy the funder’s 
requirements, though acceptable to the client, whilst, on the other hand, it was argued by some 
funders to the contrary that TPF could rather be used as a weapon for a satisfactory settlement, 
after all, for all the parties involved. 
Since there is a possibility of conflict of interests or ethical issues arising in the presence of a third- 
party funder in an arbitration, it was felt by many participants that such presence should be 
disclosed. On this point various issues were raised as to the nature (i.e. whether mandatory or 
voluntary disclosure) and the extent of disclosure (i.e. whether of the mere existence of a third-party 
funding arrangement or of the actual funding agreement), to whom to disclose (whether to the 
arbitral tribunal and / or to all the parties and stakeholders involved) and the time to disclose 
(before or at the beginning of the arbitration, or at some point in the arbitral proceedings)[See on 
the issue of timing of TPF impacting ICSID jurisdiction in a most recent case: Teinver S.A., Transportes 
de Cercanías S.A. and Autobuses Urbanos del Sur S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/09/1(Decision on Jurisdiction, December 21, 2012), including Dr Kamal Hossain’s Separate 
Opinion, http://italaw.com/chronological_list.htm] It was felt that the representatives of the third-
party funding companies present were not in favour of an extensive disclosure of the terms and 
conditions whatever might have been agreed between the third-party funder and its client as in 
many respects confidentiality rules apply for various reasons (including the sensitive nature of 
information, or matters involved may be concerned with the economics of the deal, etc.) and in their 
view no question of mandatory disclosure should arise, let alone the fact that there does not exist so 
far on the international level any established rules requiring such disclosure. Some participants felt 
that in some situations there may be a need for disclosure in good faith, otherwise it would lead to 
the breach of procedural good faith. When some participant questioned as to why third-party 
funders are ‘secretive about disclosure’ to which a funder representative retorted by saying that it is 
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preferable to use the expression ‘cautious about disclosure’ to better reflect the state of affairs. 
According to third-party funders, if for any reason the conflict of interests, transparency, adverse 
costs, or security for costs is in issue, or a settlement is being discussed, only limited disclosure of 
third-party funding is tolerable.  
One of the important issues discussed concerned TPF in the context of investor-State arbitration. 
Thus, as a recipient of TPF a State party may have its sovereign authority issues or political 
implications as a third-party funder may exercise control over the dispute strategy and management 
whilst the former may have little or no control as it may have to submit to the whims and 
considerations of the third-party, often contrary to the State’s public policy. There could also be the 
possibility of the state’s regulatory or nationalization measures being attributed to the interest of 
the third- party funder which might not be unusual though in the case of some corrupt governments. 
Thus, there could be issues of public policy, transparency and the State’s accountability to the public 
when the relationship between the State and the third-party funder may not be perceived as level 
playing because of the overbearing control exercised by the third-party funder. It has been warned 
by some participants that the disclosure of the presence of a third-party funder on the other side is 
essential to the State party in the public interest. 
Last but not least, the serious question whether TPF should be regulated or not was debated 
passionately. If it is to be regulated, then how - by hard law or soft law? The issues such as the 
extent of regulation and its modus operandi were also discussed. The overall question of regulation 
of TPF centred on dealing with some ethical issues, i.e. to prevent the: (i) abuse of TPF arrangement 
for excessive and unreasonable profiteering (e.g.. 90% of the award proceeds) in some cases, (ii) 
unreasonable exertion of influence in arbitration strategy including selection of arbitrators defying 
the requirement of impartiality and independence of arbitrators, (iii) possible exploitation of 
attorney-client privilege and confidentiality and (iv) funding of frivolous cases intended to inflate the 
value of funders’ portfolios,  and, above all, to avoid a subprime-mortgage-induced financial disaster 
like situation of the recent past in the field of arbitration that might cause irreparable reputational 
damage to arbitration as an institution itself. The soft-law, i.e. non-binding, instrument such as the 
Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders (November 2011) issued by the Association of Litigation 
Funders of England and Wales was not considered robust enough to deal with the concerns 
expressed, let alone the question of its applicability to international arbitration. One participant 
reminded the International Chamber of Commerce of its duty to serve the international business 
community in this respect by taking timely measures to develop principles and rules to regulate TPF. 
Some other participants also called for initiatives by other international professional bodies such as 
IBA and ICCA, etc., in this respect. 
These were just some of the concerns expressed in respect of TPF. It was, however, felt by the 
majority of the participants that whilst TPF is a welcome option and not a bad idea at all as it allows 
a financially distressed party, either claimant or respondent, to have access to justice otherwise 
denied, it needs to be regulated for the welfare of the arbitrating parties (and not in the least for the 
protection of the reputation of third-party arbitration funders) and the stability and the longevity of 
arbitration as an institution itself (perhaps a reminder in the wake of some states’ renouncing of 
investment treaty arbitration lately!). 
One thus needs hardly reminding:  
‘Fire can burn down the earth, but if its use is regulated it can contribute to the welfare of all on the planet’. 
 
